What BRICS, Now “G11”, Means For The West
The push for opening the doors to BRICS has certainly come from China and Russia. The global system is under new stresses with the collapse of Russia's ties with the US and Europe and the rise of serious tensions between the US and China.
By Kanwal Sibal
The expansion of BRICS has considerable geopolitical significance. It is a consequential step forward in changing the balance between the West and others in the global system. The number of countries from the Global South that formally applied for BRICS membership or showed interest in joining the grouping indicates a growing discontent with the West-dominated global order that continues to be shaped in accordance with the policy priorities and interests of the major Western powers. The Global South wants greater democratisation of international relations and an enhancement of its role in global mechanisms.
It also signifies a rejection of the West’s policies towards both Russia and China, of the narrative that Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine and China’s hegemonic ambitions threaten the existing global order, and that the global ideological conflict is between democracies and autocracies. This can be concluded from the rush to join BRICS while the conflict in Ukraine continues and despite its damaging consequences for the developing world by way of disruption of food, fertiliser, and energy supplies and price rise.
The push for opening the doors to BRICS has certainly come from China and Russia. The global system is under new stresses with the collapse of Russia’s ties with the US and Europe and the rise of serious tensions between the US and China.
Ties between Russia and the West will take a long time to repair. Western sanctions against Russia will not be rolled back in the foreseeable future unless there is a radical political change in Russia in favour of the West, which is most unlikely.
The US now sees the rise of China as a threat to its global supremacy. It is seeking to thwart China’s technological progress, as it is in the advanced and critical technology areas that power contestations lie in the future. The US will prefer to achieve its goals without direct military conflict with either Russia or China, but it is strengthening its alliances in Europe and Russia as a deterrence.
This US policy is bringing Russia and China closer together strategically. The imbalance of power between Russia and China is growing. China has become the largest manufacturing power in the world and the biggest exporter. It is technologically advanced in many areas and controls the supply chains in some critical technologies and raw materials. Russia has huge natural resources and is a formidable nuclear power, but its small population and a shrunk manufacturing base are a handicap. In many advanced technology areas such as telecommunications, renewable energy, electrical vehicles, etc. it is not in the race with China.
Nevertheless, Russia and China combined present a formidable challenge to Western power. Together they dominate the Eurasian continent. They are now conducting joint naval exercises in the western Pacific and even the Mediterranean as a political signal. They oppose the Indo-Pacific concept and the Quad. They cooperate in the UN Security Council against Western moves when required.
Russia and China want to reduce the hegemony of the US dollar, to which end they are trading in each other’s currencies. Eighty per cent of their bilateral trade is today in their national currencies. President Putin has long argued in favour of a BRICS reserve currency, though it is not an easily achievable objective. What is more feasible, and is happening already, is for the BRICS countries to trade with each other in their national currencies.
President Lula has voiced the growing mood by asking why Brazil and China have to trade with each other in US $ and not in their own currencies. Lula’s proposal is to create a payment method independent of the dollar to be worked out with the help of the BRICS Bank, whose chairman is Dilma Rousseff. India too is seeking to use the Indian rupee in trading with some of its partners.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in his press conference in Johannesburg on August 24 put the project of a BRICS reserve currency in perspective. Nobody is talking now about a common currency, he said, the focus at this point being on mutual trade, economic projects, and investment independent of the dollar, euro, or yen, of the system controlled by the US and its Western allies.
He drew attention to the BRICS project of a “pool of reserve currencies” as a prelude to the planned steps to facilitate the use of national currencies, and, most importantly, to form an alternative payment system, on which the finance ministers and central bank governors of the five countries have been charged with working out the details.
The expansion of BRICS seems to have been based less on any well-defined criteria and more on reaching a quick consensus on which countries from the 23 that had applied for membership would be acceptable to all the five existing members. Four of the six new members are from the same broad region – Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, and Egypt – which shows the lop-sided nature of the expansion. Foreign Minister Lavrov has validated this in terms of the plus value they would bring to the logistics projects such as the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Northern Sea Route.
Interestingly, Lavrov played down the significance of several oil-producing countries joining BRICS, a point that has been played up in Western commentary as a precursor to a potential de-dollarisation of the oil trade. This concern is also fed by the fact that the two biggest consumers of oil, China and India, are BRICS members. Asked whether Russia had proposed establishing a BRICS Energy Alliance or a BRICS Energy Bank, Lavrov played down the issue, noting that BRICS already had structures dealing with energy, and that if the new countries joining BRICS had some initiatives to propose they would be looked at and carried out.
In deciding on expansion, no consensus seems to have been reached on including an Asian country even though Asia is seen as the centre of the shift of global power away from the West.
Indonesia, present at Johannesburg, had applied for membership but apparently withdrew its candidature at the last minute. China would have opposed Vietnam’s candidature, and that of Bangladesh too, which it would tie up with that of Pakistan, to not appear to be abandoning a close ally as well as to deny giving political advantage to India. Ethiopia’s inclusion seems surprising, evidently pushed by China, although Algeria’s would have been more obvious. Nigeria, an obvious African candidate, did not apply for membership, it seems.
Foreign Minister Lavrov has given an indication of the criteria that underlay the expansion decision, namely, “the weight, prominence, and importance of the candidates and their international standing” being primary factors. The aim was, according to him, to “recruit like-minded countries into our ranks that believe in a multipolar world order and the need for more democracy and justice in international relations” and who “champion a bigger role for the Global South in global governance”. Ethiopia, in the throes of a civil war and reeling under an economic crisis, would hardly be eligible under this criteria.
The BRICS summit has endorsed an initiative to invite over 60 countries to engage with BRICS in a BRICS Plus/Outreach and partner countries format. A list of countries for partner country status will be worked out at the level of Foreign Ministers for the 2024 BRICS summit at Kazan in Russia.
Speculation about a name change of BRICS, now that there are 11 members in all, seems to have been set at rest for the moment with member countries seemingly wanting to retain the BRICS brand name to also emphasise continuity in the work of the grouping.
India has supported the BRICS expansion. We have very friendly ties with all the new members. With five of the new six members, India has a strategic partnership. The leaders of five of the six countries have been chief guests at our Republic Day celebrations. With Ethiopia, our relations have been traditionally strong. In Africa, Ethiopia is the largest recipient of long-term concessional credit from India.
The world now has the G7 group of Western countries plus Japan, the G20 that has G7, the EU, and 12 countries of the Global South as members. Both these groups have been formed at the initiative of the West. The expanded BRICS is a veritable G11 group, but one constituted by non-western powers, with seven members that are also part of G20. This evolution in group formation reflects the changing power shifts that are taking place globally, from an entirely Western group to a mixed group of Western and Global South countries, and, now to an enlarged non-Western group, all of them seeking to address the issues of global governance.
Kanwal Sibal was Indian Foreign Secretary and Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France, and Russia, and Deputy Chief Of Mission in Washington.
