By Faisal Mahmud
The trays of crisp, tangy golgappas, or fuchkas as they are known in Bangladesh, weaving through the crowd at Bangladesh’s National Day reception in New Delhi on March 26 provided a welcome culinary respite in a period of heightened geopolitical tension.
This shared street snack served as a calculated, edible metaphor for a bilateral relationship between the two neighbouring countries tentatively rediscovering its rhythm. As diplomats and policy hands lingered over the appetisers, the optics suggested hope of repair.
Bangladesh High Commissioner Riaz Hamidullah noted that “the simplest gestures carry the deepest meanings”, while India’s Minister of State for External Affairs Kirti Bardhan Singh spoke of a “natural partnership” regaining momentum.
Compared with the chill of 2025, the atmosphere was unmistakably warmer. The landslide electoral victory of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Tarique Rahman, has forced a new chapter in Dhaka’s political landscape—one that New Delhi has greeted with a pragmatic, if cautious, nod.
For an Indian establishment haunted by the twin spectres of Bangladeshi “instability” and “Islamist drift” in the last 17 months or so, the BNP’s decisive mandate provides a welcome clarity. The fear of an “Islamist turn”, once a fixture of Indian strategic anxiety, has receded into the background for now.
Yet this “golgappa diplomacy”—as it was called by a section of the Indian media—risks masking a fragile underlying reality. The bilateral bond does not merely require a tune-up; it demands a wholesale redefinition. While the political reset is tangible, the structural tensions that have historically sabotaged ties remain stubborn.
India’s response to the BNP’s ascent has been a study in understated engagement. There are no grand bargains or sweeping proclamations, only the steady hum of functionalism.
Diesel flew in from across the border in times of fuel crisis and the ongoing connectivity projects and security coordination hold steady. This incrementalism is born of necessity. New Delhi understands that any overt embrace of the new BNP government could trigger a nationalist backlash in a country where perceptions of Indian meddling are a potent political third rail.
Anti-India sentiment remains a foundational undercurrent in Bangladeshi politics, cutting across party lines even as it is amplified by the BNP’s base. For the average Bangladeshi, grievances are rooted in the unresolved Teesta water-sharing agreement, border fatalities, and persistent trade imbalances. These are lived realities that dictate the limits of Dhaka’s manoeuvrings.
The BNP government cannot ignore these domestic pressures. It must execute a delicate dance: leaning too close to New Delhi invites charges of subservience, while drifting too far carries ruinous economic and strategic costs.
A new brand of “uncertainty” for India
For India, the return of the BNP introduces a new brand of “uncertainty”. The era of Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League provided an unprecedented alignment with Indian security interests, particularly in flushing out insurgents along the border. The BNP, by contrast, has a history of a more assertive, and at times adversarial, nationalist posture.
Furthermore, the shadow of Sheikh Hasina remains the elephant in the room. Though she is no longer at the helm, her legacy—and her supporters [still] within the state apparatus—creates a friction point for the new administration.
The BNP must now prove it can recalibrate foreign policy without triggering institutional gridlock, while India must learn to deal with a leadership that lacks the instinctive habits of the previous decade’s cooperation.
High Commissioner Hamidullah’s call to address “sensitive issues with sincerity and candour” underscores the difficulty of the task. These issues are structural, not just sentimental.
Trade remains heavily skewed in India’s favour, and despite growth, the diversification of Bangladeshi exports remains sluggish. The Teesta water dispute remains a casualty of India’s internal federal politics, specifically the interests of West Bengal. For Dhaka, it remains an existential priority affecting regional stability and agriculture.
Connectivity and security also remain double-edged swords. While rail links and port access offer transformative potential for a subregion including Nepal and Bhutan, their success hinges on a public support that is easily spooked. In the security realm, the BNP must demonstrate it can combat extremism and cross-border crime effectively without appearing to be acting as India’s regional deputy.
The critical element of trust
Ultimately, the most critical—and elusive—element is trust. The political alignment under Hasina provided a predictable, if complacent, stability. The current moment is defined by volatility but also by a rare opportunity to rebuild the relationship on a broader, more inclusive foundation that accounts for public sentiment rather than just elite-level agreements.
This requires a shift in mindset. India must engage Bangladesh as a sovereign equal with its own distinct priorities, rather than a junior partner or a strategic buffer zone. Conversely, Bangladesh must move beyond a reflexive suspicion of its larger neighbour to fully realise the benefits of cooperation.
Yes, the sight of diplomats sharing snacks is a minor detail in the theatre of geopolitics, yet it signals a return to a functional normalcy grounded in the everyday. Symbolism can open a door, but it cannot settle a water treaty or balance a trade ledger.
Moving from shared snacks to a lasting strategic reset will require way more than polite words; it will require the political courage to confront the uncomfortable truths that both capitals have spent years avoiding. The ice is breaking, but the currents beneath remain treacherous.
Faisal Mahmud is a Dhaka-based journalist and analyst.
