The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in southeastern Bangladesh, known for its stunning landscapes and cultural diversity, has been plagued by conflicts that make peace seem like a distant dream. Recently, this region has once again found itself in the headlines, with violent clashes in Khagrachari leaving several people dead and scores injured. The trigger was a seemingly local incident—a Bengali man accused of motorcycle theft was lynched, and the subsequent tensions between the Bengali and hill communities escalated into gunfire, arson, and destruction. Despite authorities stepping in, the situation remains tense, reminding us that the issues in CHT are far from resolved.
The tensions in the CHT aren’t just about land or resources—they’re deeply rooted in history, politics, and, of course, geography. Adding to the complexity is the region’s location at the crossroads of Bangladesh, India’s northeastern states, and Myanmar, a strategic position that invites not only domestic but also international interest. The current leadership of Bangladesh now faces the daunting challenge of solving a conflict that has both local and cross-border dimensions.
Rewinding back to the early days of Bangladesh, the CHT was largely self-contained. The people of the hills maintained their own traditions, languages, and ways of life, mostly isolated from the hustle of the plains. But this changed rapidly in post-partition. The construction of the Kaptai Dam in the 1960s, for example, displaced tens of thousands of people from the hills, flooding entire villages and leaving bitter memories. After the birth of Bangladesh in 1971, the government encouraged migration of Bengali people to the CHT, which led to deep resentment among the hill communities, who felt that their way of life and land were under threat.
These tensions eventually boiled over into armed conflict. In the 1970s, the hill people, led mainly by the Chakma, formed the Shanti Bahini, an armed group that took up arms against the Bangladeshi government. What was supposed to be a fight for rights quickly turned into a long-running insurgency, marked by guerrilla warfare, displacement, and violence. To make things more interesting (or complicated, depending on your perspective), India decided to throw its hat into the ring. India, dealing with its own insurgencies in the Northeast and wary of Bangladesh’s growing ties with Pakistan and China, provided support to the Shanti Bahini. Arms, training, and even sanctuary in the state of Tripura flowed across the border, ensuring the conflict remained protracted.
The bloody years of conflict eventually led to a breakthrough in 1997 when the CHT Peace Accord was signed. The accord promised greater autonomy for the hill areas, land rights, and a phased military withdrawal. On paper, it seemed like a sensible deal—one that would bring peace to the hills and allow for a more integrated Bangladesh. However, like many political promises, implementation has been slow and incomplete. Land disputes remain unresolved, the promised autonomy feels more symbolic than real, and the military presence in the region is still substantial. In other words, the accord has done little more than paper over the cracks, and the cracks are widening again.
The recent violence in Khagrachari is a clear sign that tensions are still very much alive. The Bengali and hill communities continue to be at odds, often competing for control over land, resources, and political power. The situation has become a powder keg, where any spark—like a lynching or a theft—can ignite widespread violence. The government’s response to impose Section 144 (a law banning gatherings) and send in more law enforcement might restore calm in the short term, but it’s hardly a long-term solution.
Now, as if the domestic issues weren’t tricky enough, Bangladesh also has to consider its neighbors in this equation. The CHT borders India’s volatile northeastern states—Tripura, Mizoram, and Assam—where ethnic diversity and insurgency movements keep India’s security forces busy. The people of the CHT share cultural and ethnic ties with communities across the border, particularly the Chakma and Tripura, creating a transnational dimension to the conflict. If violence flares up in the CHT, it could spill over into India’s Northeast, destabilizing an already fragile region.
Then, there’s Myanmar. To the southeast of the CHT lies Myanmar’s Rakhine State, where the Rohingya crisis has drawn global attention. Bangladesh already shoulders the burden of hosting nearly a million Rohingya refugees, and the last thing it needs is more instability along its border. The proximity of the CHT to the Myanmar frontier makes the region a potential gateway for cross-border smuggling, arms trafficking, and insurgent movements. In short, the CHT is like a high-stakes poker table, and everyone from Bangladesh to Myanmar and India is trying to protect their own chips.
So, how does Bangladesh solve this complex puzzle? First, the government needs to take a serious look at the 1997 Peace Accord and, more importantly, start implementing it. Land disputes are at the heart of many of the tensions in the CHT. If the land claims of the hill people are not addressed, violence will continue to flare up. While it’s easy to issue statements about autonomy and land rights, real progress will only happen when the state acknowledges and respects the historical claims of those living in the hills. This means working through complicated land records, compensating those who were displaced, and providing guarantees that the people in the hills won’t be squeezed out of their ancestral homes.
While sorting out land rights is critical, it’s equally important to promote reconciliation between the hill and Bengali populations. Economic development might just be the key to this. Instead of competing for land and resources, both communities could benefit from joint ventures in areas like sustainable agriculture, tourism, and renewable energy. The hills are rich in natural beauty, and if properly managed, tourism could provide a major economic boost to both groups. Plus, nothing says “we’re all in this together” like making money off the same tourists.
On the international front, Bangladesh will need to play a delicate balancing act. With India, there’s a lot of room for cooperation, especially in border security and economic development. India’s northeastern states are keen to connect more deeply with Southeast Asia, and stable conditions in the CHT would support this regional integration. Meanwhile, Bangladesh should continue diplomatic engagement with Myanmar—not just to address the Rohingya issue, but also to ensure that the CHT doesn’t become a new hotspot for cross-border militancy.
Finally, let’s talk development. The CHT has long been left behind in terms of infrastructure, healthcare, and education. By investing in these sectors, Bangladesh can transform the region from a conflict zone into an economic hub. It’s not just about building roads and schools; it’s about creating a future where people are too busy making a living to be fighting over land. Infrastructure can be the bridge—literally and figuratively—that brings the hill people and Bengalis closer together, fostering collaboration instead of competition.
The CHT conflict is a tangled mess of historical grievances, ethnic rivalries, and geopolitical dynamics. There’s no magic bullet to solve it, but with a mix of political will, economic development, and diplomatic finesse, Bangladesh can start untangling the knot. It’s time to turn this beautiful yet troubled region into a symbol of peace and prosperity, not just a footnote in history books filled with tales of conflict.
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Rajeev Ahmed
The Editor of Geopolits.com and the Author of the book titled Bengal Nexus
